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NOTES AND COMMENTS
Fair Labor Standards Act-Exemption of Agricultural Employees-
The "Area of Production"
Plaintiff, suing for unpaid minimum and overtime wages, was em-
ployed as a night watchman in a cotton warehouse located in a town
of 6,309 population in an area characterized by a large volume of cotton
production. Over ninety-five percent of the cotton regularly received
by the warehouse was grown within twenty miles of the warehouse.
The defendant, operator of the warehouse, claimed that the plaintiff was
exempt from the Fair Labor Standards Act1 under section 13 (a) (10).2
This section of the act completely exempts from both the minimum
wage and the overtime provisions employees engaged in storing or
processing agricultural commodities within the "area of production."
And Congress conferred upon the Administrator of the Fair Labor
Standards Act the duty to define the "area of production. ' 3 Therefore,
in order to be exempt an employee must not only be engaged in one of
the operations enumerated in the act, but his place of employment must
fall within the Administrator's definition of "area of production.' 4
The Administrator defines tarea of production" as being in open
country or in a rural community. He further qualifies this by requiring
that in order for a business to be considered as within the "area of
production" ninety-five percent of its supply of commodities must come
from the immediate vicinity. In the case of cotton compressing, that
percentage must come from within a twenty mile radius of the place of
business. The most controversial qualification placed in the "area of
production" test involves the population of the place where the business
'Fair Labor Standards Act, 52 STAT. 1060 (1938), as amended, 29 U.S.C.
§§ 201-219 (1952). Sections 1-11 of the act generally provide that all employees
engaged in commerce or in the production of goods theref6r are entitled to a set
minimum wage and certain overtime benefits. The particular employees here in
question were found to be in the production of goods for commerce because their
occupations were directly essential and closely related to such production. See
Kirschbaum v. Walling, 316 U.S. 517 (1942).
SLovvorn v. Miller, 215 F.2d 601 (5th Cir. 1954). See text at note 10 infra.8 Fair Labor Standards Act § 13(a) (10), 52 STAT. 1060 (1938), as amended,
29 U.S.C. § 213 (a) (10) (1952), provides that the minimum wage and overtime
provisions of the act shall not be applicable to "any individual employed within
the area of production (as defined by the Administrator), engaged in handling,
packing, storing, ginning, compressing, pasteurizing, drying, preparing in their
raw or natural state, or canning of agricultural or horticultural commodities
for market, or in making cheese or butter or other dairy products."
' The reasons which prompted Congress to grant this power to define to the
Administrator were set out by Justice Frankfurter in the early case of Addison
v. Holly Hill Fruit Products, Inc., 322 U.S. 607 (1944). "In view . . . of thie
variety of agricultural conditions and industries throughout the country the bounds
of these areas could not be defined by Congress. Neither was it deemed wise
to leave such economic determinations to the contingencies and inevitable diversi-
ties of litigation. And so Congress gave the Administrator power to assess all
the factors relevant to the subject matter." Id. at 614.
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is located. It is expressly provided that no establishment located with-
in a city or town of more than 2,500 population can be exempt.5
Tobin v. Traders Compress C0.6 was the first direct attack on the
Administrator's population test in the courts. In this case the Court of
Appeals for the Tenth Circuit held that the definition was based on
relevant economic conditions. The court pointed out that a population of
2,500 is the popular dividing line between urban and rural communities
according to the Bureau of Census and other agencies. Although the
court took notice of the fact that over eighty percent of all the cotton-
compressing industry would fall outside the exemption because of the
population test alone, it ruled that the Administrator's definition is
neither arbitrary nor capricious. The court granted that the test is not
perfect; however, it pointed out that no better criteria have been ad-
vanced and that the power to define was given to the Administrator and
not the courts.
In the Traders Compress case there was a strong dissent. 7 The
dissenting opinion takes the position that a test based on population
amounts to an unfair discrimination. It urges that too much emphasis is
placed on the mere location of the business establishment and not on
the character of the community which may surround it. The dissent
brings to light the very strong possibility that two identical agricultural
industries may be located not more than a mile apart, yet one might
get the advantages of being exempt from paying minimum wages and
overtime while the other could still be required to meet these standards.
It further states that the population of a town generally has nothing to
do with whether or not such town is within a particular "area of pro-
duction."
In Jenkins v. Durkin8 the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, by
way of dictum, expressed the opinion that the population criterion of
the Administrator's definition is an invalid standard. The.conclusion of
this court is based completely on the reasoning set out by the dissent in
the Traders Compress case. 9 This dictum set the stage for the holding
of the same court of appeals in the case under discussion, LovVorn v.
-29 C.F.R. § 536.2 (1956).6199 F.2d 8 (10th Cir. 1952). The fact that the courts have the power to
declare a regulation of the Administrator to be in excess of the power delegated by
Congress was established in Addison v. Holly Hill Fruit Products, Inc., 322 U.S.
607 (1944). In that case the Court ruled that a provision in the Administrator's
definition requiring that an employer have no more than seven employees if he
was to claim the exemption was an arbitrary and capricious criterion for de-
termining "area of production." Having come to this decision, the Court announced
that it would refrain from enforcing any part of the regulation until the number of
employees test had been removed. The question of the population test was also
raised in this case, but the Court reserved any decision concerning it.
199 F.2d 8, 11 (10th Cir. 1952) (dissenting opinion).
8208 F.2d 941 (5th Cir. 1954).9 See note 7 supra.
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Miller.10 The court there found that the employer met all the qualifica-
tions for the exemption except for the fact that his business establish-
ment was located within a town of 6,309 population, greater than the
prescribed maximum of 2,500. The population criterion was held to be
a standard which discriminated among businesses located within a
single "area" of agricultural production. The court again cited with
approval the dissent in the Tenth Circuit case of Tobin v. Traders Com-
press Co. and held that the population criterion was arbitrary, capricious,
and invalid.
Within one year from the date of this decision the Fifth Circuit
was again faced with the same problem in Mitchell v. Budd." Relying
on its decisions in Jenkins v. Durkin and Lovvorn v. Miller, the court
again held that the Administrator's definition was invalid. The Supreme
Court granted certiorari in the Budd case,' 2 because of conflicting de-
cisions in the Fifth and Tenth Circuits as to the validity of the popula-
tion test, and reversed the Fifth Circuit. The Court found that the
Administrator was compelled to draw "a line between agricultural
enterprises operating under rural-agricultural conditions and those sub-
ject to urban-industrial conditions,"' 3 that the Administrator had stayed
within the allowable limits after a reasoned and objective consideration
of all the factors involved, and that his definition was a valid one.
It is understood that prior to the holding of the Court in the Budd
case the Administrator was in the process of drafting a completely new
and different definition of "area of production." However, with the
coiing of this decision he was able to abandon this new plan and to con-
tinie to restrict the applicability of the exemption in those industries
storing or processing the products of local agriculture. The growths,
shifts, and changes in the population of this country in recent years
have affected the farming communities and the towns located in the
heart of agricultural areas. In the light of these changes, it seems
reasonable to suggest that what was once a proper measure of "area
of production" might now require some amending if the intended benefit
to the agricultural industry is not to be lost.
WILLIAM W. SUTTLE
20 215 F.2d 601 (5th Cir. 1954). See text at note 2 supra.
11221 F.2d 406 (5th Cir. 1955).
" Mitchell v. Budd, 350 U.S. 473 (1956).
18 350 U.S. at 478.
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